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Growth andRegionalDisparities in SouthAmerica,
1890–1960 The processes of economic development and eco-
nomic growth in Latin America show highly diverse patterns
across countries and periods. Argentina, for instance, experienced
rapid growth until World War I, following an export-led model,
and a relative decline afterward, whereas economic growth in
Brazil and Mexico was faster in the second half of the twentieth
century, in both cases driven by state-led industrialization policies.
Several studies at the national level focused on the relationship be-
tween the growth of national GDP per capita and the regional
growth of subnational units, and emphasize the interaction be-
tween the localization of natural resources, trade policies, agglom-
eration forces, and economic intervention in shaping the regional
income inequality of Latin American countries in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
This article is based on a newly assembled data set that includes
estimates of regional per-capita GDP for three South American
countries—Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay—from the mid-nineteenth
century to the mid-twentieth century. With this data set, we explore
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the evolution of inequality and the dynamics of regional growth,
considering, for the ﬁrst time, a group of South American countries
at both the national and subnational levels, complemented with an
international dimension.1
Regarding the evolution of regional income disparities, our
background assumption is the one advanced by Williamson, which
suggests that during the process of economic development, differ-
ences in regional incomes exhibited an evolution according to an
inverted U-shaped pattern. This phenomenon is the result of in-
creasing inequality in the initial stages the industrialization when
the leading regions start to grow and a second period of decreasing
inequality (related to convergence) when the initially lagged re-
gions start to grow faster and catch up with the leaders. Our results
show that our three South American countries do not conform to
this hypothesis. When all of the subnational units are analyzed
together, the ﬁnding is a U-shaped curve with high inequality at
the end of the nineteenth century, a minimum in the 1940s, and
another local maximum in the 1960s and the early 1970s after the
collapse of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies.2
1 For México, see José Aguilar-Retureta, “The GDP per Capita of the Mexican Regions
(1895–1930): New Estimates,” Revista de Historia Económica, XXXIII (2015), 387–423; forChile,
Badia-Miró, “The Evolution of the Location of Economic Activity in Chile in the Long Run: A
Paradox of Extreme Concentration in Absence of Agglomeration Economies,” Estudios de Econ-
omía, XLII (2015), 143–167; for Uruguay, Pablo Castro andWillebald, “Desigualdad regional del
ingreso en Uruguay durante la Primera Globalización: primeras estimaciones y algunas hipótesis,”
paper presented in V CLADHE, São Paulo, July 2016; Julio Martínez-Galarraga, Adrián
Rodríguez Miranda, and Willebald, “Regional Income Inequality in Uruguay in a Century
(1908–2008): Did Public Production Policy Contribute to an Equalizing Process?” paper presented
in V CLADHE, São Paulo, July 2016; for Argentina, Florencia Aráoz and Nicolini, “Persistence vs.
Reversal andAgglomeration Economies vs.Natural Resources: Regional Inequality in Argentina in
the First Half of the Twentieth Century,”Working Papers in Economic History, 15-05 (Universi-
dad Carlos III, 2015), available at https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/20846; Mauricio
Talassino, “Producto Bruto Geográﬁco de 1946 de las provincias argentinas: Una estimación pre-
liminar,” paper presented at the Tercer Foro Bienal Iberoamericano de Estudios del Desarrollo,
Montevideo y Tacuarembó,Uruguay, 2016; for Chilean departments, Badia-Miró, “La localización
de la actividad económica en Chile, 1890–1973: Su impacto de largo plazo,” unpub. Ph.D. diss.
(Univ. of Barcelona, 2008); idem, “Evolution of the Location of Economic Activity in Chile in
the Long Run,” 143–167; for the Uruguayan provinces; Martínez-Galarraga, Rodríguez Miranda,
and Willebald, “Regional Income Inequality in Uruguay in a Century (1908–2008).”
2 Jeffrey Williamson, “Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A
Description of Patterns,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIII (1965), 1–84. Reduc-
tion in regional inequality and regional convergence are different concepts that represent close
processes. The former represents improvements in the distribution of incomes per capita
within a territory; the latter identiﬁes a reduction in the income gap between the lagged
and the leader regions (a catching-up process).
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Our results also show that the evolution of regional inequal-
ity is different in each country: Whereas Chile shows a higher
inequality and a U-shaped evolution (reduction of inequality
before a slight increase in 1960), Uruguay presents a monotoni-
cally declining regional inequality, and Argentina, like Chile,
exhibits a U-shaped evolution with decreasing disparities until
the beginning of the twentieth century and increasing inequality
thereafter. Our interpretation of this evidence is that the process
was dominated by a slow—and sometimes truncated—structural
change and a sustained prevalence of natural resources in domes-
tic production and exports. The upshot is a decreasing regional
inequality with short periods of spatial concentration of eco-
nomic activity (mostly around the administrative capitals led by
the service sector). This evolution was mediated by successive
waves of technological change, the integration of international
markets and globalization (expressed in the reduction of transport
costs and price convergence), trade policies, mining cycles, and
important institutional changes related to the ownership of nat-
ural resources.
The presence of convergence at the national level differs
according to periods and countries. Uruguay shows convergence
in every analyzed sub-period, but the provinces of Argentina
converged only during the period of the ﬁrst globalization. The
provinces of Chile generally converged, but the presence of out-
liers contravenes the convergence hypothesis during the ﬁrst
globalization. Convergence at a regional level (including all of
the subnational units from the three countries in the same analysis)
holds true for the period of the ﬁrst globalization but not after-
ward. The poorest regions diverged from the richest ones during
the central decades of the twentieth century, although the poorest
regions converged during the ﬁrst globalization.
This second set of empirical ﬁndings is likely the result of
the combined potential of the subnational units to take advantage
of agglomeration forces (inducing high growth rates in the
main cities and in the administrative capitals, led by the industrial
and service sectors). At the same time, other factors also played a
key role. On the one hand, abundance and localization, and the
“lottery” of natural resources constituted important determinants.
On the other hand, the push from technological change, the
integration with (or dis-integration from) the international and
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domestic market, or the existence of public policies toward indus-
trialization contributed to the evolution of regional disparity.
DATA One important problem in the attempt to assemble a
unique data set of subnational GDPs for the three countries is the
existence of different benchmarks for the censuses for each country
(our main source). Another important problem, observed in all of
the countries, is the lack of direct estimations for regional produc-
tion ﬁgures. To compensate for the lack of regional GDP ﬁgures for
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, we borrow multiple methodolo-
gies from the recent literature. In general terms, our goal is to ob-
tain distribution keys to disaggregate national-sector GDPs into a
territorial division (usually administrative and political). The distri-
bution keys consist of different proxies of labor or land productiv-
ity, production, factors affecting production, and population.
The original data from Argentina for the years 1895, 1914,
1946, 1953, and 1960 come from four previous contributions.
The estimation for 1895 derives from a modiﬁed version of the
Geary–Stark methodology, in which the total GDP of each sector
is distributed among the twenty-four provinces based on the share
of each province in an economic variable that proxies the total
value added of the sector. For instance, the national aggregate
value added in livestock production is distributed according to
the share of each province in the total national value of cattle, as
calculated by the formula,
YLPi ¼ YLPARG
GVLPi
GVLPARG
: (1)
Yi
LP is the value added in livestock production in province i;
YARG
LP is the value added in Argentina of livestock production;GVi
LP
is the gross value of livestock in province i; and GVARG
LP is the gross
value of livestock in the whole country. The main sources are the
national GDP and the Segundo Censo Nacional de la República Argentina,
collected on May 10, 1895.3
3 For 1895, see Aráoz and Nicolini, “The Evolution of Regional GDPs in Argentina during
the Period of Globalization at the End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century,” paper
presented at the LI meeting of the AAEP, Tucumán, 2016; for 1914, idem, “Persistence vs. Re-
versal and Agglomeration Economies vs. Natural Resources”; for 1946, Talassino, “Producto
Bruto Geográﬁco de 1946 de las provincias argentinas”; for 1953 and 1960, Víctor J. Elías, “Un
informe de la economía de Tucumán, sus determinantes y perspectivas,” in idem (ed.), Informe
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The estimate for 1914 is based on the identity between the
GDP and the sum of the returns of factors of production (labor,
land, and capital). The main source in this approach is the Tercer
Censo Nacional de la República Argentina, collected on 1914, from
which stocks of land, capital, and quantity of workers are available.
Bunge’s book Riqueza y renta de la Argentina provides approxima-
tions of the rates of returns for the productive factors, and several
reports and publications by the National Department of Labor are
the main sources for wages.4
The estimation for 1946 is based on a modiﬁed Geary–Stark
methodology—implemented by distributing the sectoral national
GDP taken from Secretaría de Asuntos Económicos and the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEPAL)—among provinces. The criteria to choose the
variables that proxy sectoral productivity in each province is similar
to the one used in the estimation for 1895.5
The estimation of provincial GDPs for 1953 and 1960, calculated
by the Consejo Federal de Inversiones, collected and published by Elías,
is based on two complementary methodologies: (1) a direct estima-
tion that relies on provincial data and (2) a distribution of national
totals for some sectors using “adequate” weights. Elías provides data
about provincial population for every year since 1930; this article uses
its population data for the years 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960. For the
sobre la economía de Tucumán (Tucumán, 1996). An earlier and more indirect approach to generate
a proxy for provincial economic size in Argentina was suggested by Lucas Llach, “TheWealth of
the Provinces: The Rise and Fall of the Interior in the Political Economy of Argentina, 1880–
1910,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 2007). For the Geary–Stark methodology, see
Frank Geary and Tony Stark, “Regional GDP in the UK, 1861–1911: New Estimates,” Economic
History Review, LXVIII (2015), 123–144. “Examining Ireland’s Post-Famine Economic Growth
Performance,” Economic Journal, CXII (2002), 919–935; idem. For further detail about how to
distribute the VA in each sector, see Aráoz and Nicolini, “The Evolution of Regional GDPs in
Argentina,” 6–8. Data for GDP come from Roberto Cortés-Conde, “Estimaciones del
Producto Bruto Interno de Argentina, 1875–1935,” Working Paper, 3 (Universidad de San
Andres, 1994).
4 Alejandro E. Bunge, Riqueza y Renta de la Argentina: Su distribución y su capacidad contribu-
tiva (Buenos Aires, 1997). In “Una comparación metodológica de las estimaciones de los PIB
provinciales en Argentina en 1914,” a paper presented at IV Congreso Latinoamericano de
Historia Económica, Bogotá, July 2014, Aráoz and Nicolini estimated the provincial GDPs
in 1914 with the Geary–Stark methodology, showing that the results are similar to the ones
obtained with the identity between GDP and the retributions to the factors of production.
5 Talassino, “Producto Bruto Geográﬁco de 1946”; Secretaría de Asuntos Económicos,
Producto e Ingreso de la República Argentina en el período 1935–1954 (Buenos Aires, 1955); CEPAL,
El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina (Santiago, 1958).
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benchmarks before 1930, population ﬁgures derive from interpola-
tions within Maddison’s “Historical Statistics.”6
Regional GDP ﬁgures for Chile come from the elaboration in
previous works by Badia-Miró, who combined several strategies to
distribute the sectoral GDP among the different provinces. National
data come from Díaz, Lüders, and Wagner (correcting the industrial
ﬁgures with new estimations provided by Ducoing and Badia-Miró).
For the value added in the agrarian and in the industrial sector, we
follow the Geary–Stark methodology. Because the integration of the
labor market into the agricultural sector was low, agricultural wages
are not a good proxy to obtain productivity differences among prov-
inces. Hence, we consider the contribution of the economically
active population (EAP) to the gross production of the most repre-
sentative products and land productivity as a proxy for regional dis-
parities of productivity. For industry, we use wages to meet the same
objective.7
For the mining sector, we propose a direct approach that takes
into account total provincial exports, because of the enormous
predominance of this sector in total exports. We also include
mining production destined for domestic consumption. For the
other sectors (namely, the public sector and services), we approx-
imate the regional value added with a set of representative vari-
ables. The part of the GDP corresponding to the remaining items
has been assigned in accord with the provincial percentage for
the urban population of the entire country.8
6 Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Relevamiento de la Estructura Regional de la Economía
Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1962), I, 260. There are signiﬁcant discrepancies in total population
between Elías, “Un informe de la economía de Tucumán, sus determinantes y perspecti-
vas,” and Angus Maddison, “Historical Statistics: PIB and Population Data” (2010), avail-
able as the Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.
htm, 2013 version. For 1930, Elías’ ﬁgure for population is 10,996,262 and Maddison’s
11,896,000; for 1940, Elías’ is 13,623,981 and Maddison’s 14,169,000; for 1950, Elías’ is
16,708,523 and Maddison’s 17,150,336.
7 Badia-Miró, “La localización de la actividad económica en Chile, 1890–1973”; idem, “The
Evolution of the Location of Economic Activity in Chile in the Long Run: A Paradox of
Extreme Concentration in Absence of Agglomeration Economies,” Estudios de Economía, XLII
(2015), 143–167; José Díaz, Rolf Lüders, and GertWagner,Chile, 1810–2010: LaRepública en Cifras:
Historical Statistics (Santiago, 2016); Cristián Ducoing and Badia-Miró, “El PIB industrial de Chile
durante el ciclo del salitre, 1880–1938,” Revista Uruguaya de Historia económica, III (2013), 11–32.
8 The results of the robustness test between the ﬁgures herein and the ofﬁcial sources were
positive. Rank analysis conﬁrms them. We could identify the main differences obtained in
Santiago because it is the administrative capital of the country.
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The original data from Uruguay come from two previous
documents—(1) by Castro and Willebald for 1870, 1884, 1890, and
1900 and (2) by Martínez-Galarraga, Rodríguez Miranda, and
Willebald for 1908, 1936, 1955, and 1961. The estimations of
Uruguayan regional GDP is based on the Geary–Stark methodology,
the use of other criteria that distribute the total value added for certain
sectors, and direct estimates for sectors with available data. The esti-
mations for 1870, 1884, 1890, and 1900 follow the same methodol-
ogy. We consider seven economic activities—agriculture (livestock
and crops), manufacturing, construction, commerce, public adminis-
tration, utilities, and services—and employ data derived from
Bonino-Gayoso, Román, and Willebald as sector value added.9
We distribute the total sector value added of livestock accord-
ing to the stock of cattle (expressed in equivalent units to make
uniform the different animal species) and, in the case of crops,
according to cereal and grape production. For construction, our
reference was the total constructed area and for public administra-
tion, the income tax levied by provincial governments. Value
added corresponding to utilities includes only energy generation.
Finally, the distribution of manufacturing, commerce, and services
takes as its reference tax production ( patente de giro).
The estimations for 1908, 1936, 1955, and 1961 are based on
more available information, which extends the methodological op-
tions. We consider seven economic activities—agriculture (livestock
and crops), mining, manufacturing, construction, public administra-
tion, utilities, and services. In agriculture, we apply a modiﬁed
version of the Geary–Stark methodology for the years 1908, 1936,
and 1955 according to estimates of land productivity corresponding
to six livestock activities and ten crop productions (from the agri-
culture census). Data for 1961 come from ofﬁcial estimates.10
In mining, we use data about the EAP in 1908 and 1963 (the
population census) and obtain the intermediate years by (log)
9 For 1870, 1884, 1890, and 1900, see Castro and Willebald, “Desigualdad regional del in-
greso en Uruguay durante la Primera Globalización”; Martínez-Galarraga, Rodríguez Miranda,
and Willebald “Regional Income Inequality in Uruguay in a Century (1908–2008).” Nicolás
Bonino-Gayoso, Carolina Román, and Willebald, “Structural Change and Long-Term Pat-
terns: A Methodological Proposal for Uruguay in the Very Long Run,” paper presented at
IV Jornadas Académicas y XV Jornadas de Coyuntura Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Eco-
nómicas y de Administración, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, Uruguay, 2013 (with
the updated estimations of the authors).
10 Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay (BROU),Cuentas Nacionales (Montevideo, 1965).
SOUTH AMERICA | 123
interpolation. In 1908, we use information about wages and, in the
other years, we apply the wage gap between mining and the
manufacturing industry.
To carry out the estimation of regional industrial (manufactur-
ing and construction) value added in 1908, we use labor and wage
information from the population and industrial and commercial
census of that year. The Industrial Census of 1936 contains informa-
tion about industrial value added by province. The Dirección de
Industrias del Ministerio de Industria y Trabajo (DI-MIT) reports the
industrial gross-value output (GV) by province from 1954 to 1960;
we adjust these values to obtain an estimation of value added accord-
ing to the relationship between both measures in 1960. As before, we
consider data of 1961 according to available information.
For public utilities, we include electricity, gas, water, and
sewage. EAP information by province is available for 1908 and
1963; we estimate the province structure of 1936 and 1955 by
interpolation. We assume the same income gap for public utilities
between provinces as for industry, considering relative wages in
1936 and relative value added per capita in 1955.
We obtain provincial structure, by benchmark, from govern-
mental budgets, which provide the number of civil servants in
provinces; the total number of civil servants comes from Azar
et al. The information in governmental budgets about total paid
wages also allows us to obtain annual wage rates for Montevideo
and the other provinces for certain years. We use the gaps to ob-
tain similar rates in 1955 and 1961.11
We estimate the provincial structure of the EAP of the remain-
ing services by interpolating the ﬁgures corresponding to 1908 and
1963 to obtain absolute values of the active population for services
by deducting the previous estimates from total EAP. An extended
strategy of the Geary–Stark methodology is to calculate service-
sector wages as a weighted average of the agriculture and industry
series in each province. However, this strategy does not seem suitable
for Uruguay. Service wages were 10 percent higher than industrial
wages in 1908. A comparison between their minimum wages
(from the tripartite Wages Councils) in the 1940s and 1950s shows
11 Paola Azar et al., ¿De quiénes, para quiénes y para qué?: las ﬁnanzas públicas en el Uruguay del
siglo XX (Montevideo, 2009).
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a gap of 7 percent. Therefore, we use this last rate to determine
the wages of the other services over the industrial wages.12
With this original data set, we face a ﬁrst challenge related to
the important size differences between the Argentine and the
Chilean and Uruguayan provinces as it relates to such economic
variables as population, surface, and production. To obtain more
comparable regions, we re-size the Chilean and the Uruguayan
provinces, merging the original regions. In the case of Chile, we
group provinces according to the later regional division established
in the 1970s: Norte Grande (Tarapaca and Antofagasta), Norte
Chico (Atacama and Coquimbo), Región Central (Aconcagua,
Valparaíso, O’Higgins, Colchagua, Curicó, Talca, Maule, and
Linares), Región Metropolitana (most of Santiago province), Sur
(Ñuble, Concepción, Arauco, Bío-Bío, Malleco, Cautín, and
Valdivia), Los Lagos (Llanquihue and Chiloé), and large regions
of Aysén and Magallanes. In the case of Uruguay, we work with
three big regions: Littoral (Artigas, Paysandú, Río Negro, Salto, and
Soriano), South (Canelones, Colonia, Flores, Florida, Lavalleja,
Maldonado, Montevideo, Rocha, and San José), and North (Cerro
Largo, Durazno, Rivera, Tacuarembó, and Treinta y Tres). This
re-sizing of regions in Chile and Uruguay does not result in
appreciable distortion. The low-density regions (and high GDP
per capita) in the south and the north of Chile retain the same char-
acteristics, as do the main, highly diversiﬁed economic regions
with their prominent service sector. To homogenize the data of
the three countries further, we utilize benchmark years—1890,
1900, 1910, 1920, 1940, 1950, and 1960—interpolating the shares
from each national benchmark and re-scaling GDP ﬁgures from
Maddison in 1990 International Geary-Khamis U.S. dollars.13
12 Sebastián Fleitas and Carolina Román, “Evolución de la población económicamente
activa en el siglo XX: un análisis de la estructura por sexo, edad y generaciones,” Boletín de
la Asociación Uruguaya de Historia Económica, IX (2010), 41–64. The extended Geary–Stark
methodology comes from Joan Ramon Rosés, Martínez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado-
Fabregat, “The Upswing of Regional Income Inequality in Spain (1860–1930),” Explorations
in Economic History, XLVII (2010), 244–257.
13 The median population of the Uruguayan provinces in 1960 was around 70,000, while
the Chilean ﬁgure was around 175,000 and the Argentinian ﬁgure around 370,000 inhabitants.
Similar differences appeared with surface size. On average, Uruguayan departments are around
9,000 km2, Chilean regions around 15,000 km2, and Argentinian provinces around 100,000 km2.
Other differences between the countries could be a function of political organization. A federal
system like Argentina’s might allocate resources differently than a centralized government like
Chile’s and Uruguay’s does.
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Our methodological choices testify to signiﬁcant limitations
in the data and result in important strategies to compensate for
them. First, despite our proposed merging of provinces in Chile
and Uruguay to mitigate discrepancies with the size of Argentina’s
regions, the Argentine market is so large that it probably func-
tioned differently from those in the other countries. Argentina
would seem to have beneﬁted more from economies of scale than
did Chile and Uruguay. Second, our treatment of the three coun-
tries as intrinsically comparable depends on contrasting data
derived from different methodologies that entail distinct shortcuts.
Nonetheless, given that these same methodologies have seen exten-
sive use in the scholarly literature of Europe and North America for
the purpose of international comparison, their application in this
article would hardly seem problematical. Third, we consider
1990 International Geary-Khamis U.S. dollars to compare regional
GDP for the three countries.14
REGIONAL INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AMERICA: A LONG-RUN APPROACH
Some areas of the South American countries studied—particularly
in Argentina and Chile—were frontier economies. In these areas,
abundant land and natural resources, together with low population
density, generated high incomes during the ﬁrst globalization,
though not comparable with the rich districts of the industrialized
countries. In our three countries, the ratio between the income of
the richest and poorest regions was between 5 and 8 (Argentina 5,
Chile 8, Uruguay 2.3); in Europe these ratios were substantially
smaller (England 1.3–1.6, Sweden 1.2–2.2, Belgium 1.2–1.4,
Portugal 1.6–1.9, Spain 1.8–2.1, and France 3). The modest ratio
between average incomes in Uruguay is probably explained by the
absence of clearly distinguishable frontier areas during this period.
The specialization in livestock production or mining by many of
14 For a more detailed analysis of the methodology used to compare European countries,
see Rosés and Nikolaus Wolf, The Economic Development of Europe’s Regions: A Quantitative
History since 1900 (New York, 2016). Florencia Correa and Nicolini, “Diferencias regionales
en el costo de vida en Argentina a comienzos del siglo XX,” Investigaciones de Historia Económ-
ica, X (2014), 202–212. This methodology does not consider possible differences in relative
prices internally or price differences between countries that might not have remained stable
in the long run. Previous evidence shows that this oversimpliﬁcation might hide important
variations within Argentina.
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Argentina’s and Chile’s richest, low-density regions implies high
incomes per capita.15
The data set presented in the previous section permits detailed
information about the spatial evolution of economic activity in the
long run. The evolution of inequality across regions can be ana-
lyzed in the context of Williamson’s hypothesis of an inverted
U-shaped pattern of economic development with rising income
inequality in the early stages and falling inequality (convergence)
afterward. First, we obtain a mean-log-deviation (MLD) index to
observe dispersion, and then we decompose the inequality into
two components—between and within indexes—to understand
the drivers of this evolution better. The “within” component in-
corporates inequality at the interior of each country (without con-
sidering average income differences across countries), whereas the
“between” component serves as a weighted measure of inequality
across average national incomes (without considering the inequal-
ity within each country). We deﬁne the MLD as
MLD ¼ 1
N
Xn
i¼1Ln
μ
xi
 
; (2)
where i is the region; n is the total number of regions; xi is the GDP
per capita for each region; and μ is the GDP per capita of the whole
unit of analysis. From equation (2), we decompose MLD as
MLD ¼ MLDWithin þMLDBetween
¼Xj¼1;2;3
n j
N
MLD j þXj¼1;2;3
n j
N
ln
μ
μ j
 
; (3)
where N is the total number of regions; j=1,2,3, tells us whether a
province belongs to one country or another; μ is the GDP per capita
for our three countries together; and μ j is the GDP per capita in each
country. The results are shown in Figure 1.16
15 Willebald and Javier Juambeltz, “Land Frontier Expansion in Settler Economies (1830–
1950): Was It a Ricardian Process?” in Pinilla and Willebald (eds.), Agricultural Development in
the World Periphery: A Global Economic History Approach (New York, 2018).
16 In our case, the unit of analysis comprises the three South American countries studied
herein when the total inequality is being measured, or each of the three countries when national
inequality is being measured.
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Weobserve a decline in regional income disparity until 1940, and
a strong increase between 1950 and 1960. The export-led growth
period, based on the intensive exploitation of natural resources, seems
to have caused a major reduction of regional inequality in both the
“between” and “within” components. World War I and the Great
Depression brought a reduction in inequality, but, in this case, driven
only by the reduction in the “within” component. During the 1940s
and the 1950s, the “between” component remained stable while the
“within” component started a slight increase, strongly reinforced in
the 1960s. In 1960, both components increased considerably, push-
ing total regional inequality to levels resembling the ones observed
in 1890. Figure 2 shows that differences by country were notable:
Chile shows a slow reduction, which ended because of the expan-
sion of the oil cycle in the south during the 1960s, whereas Uruguay
presents amonotonically declining inequality andArgentina aU-shaped
evolution with decreasing disparities until the beginning of the
twentieth century and increasing inequality afterward.17
The fact that traditional analysis of inequality does not con-
sider the geographical dimension or distances between the units
17 Our division of the whole period into two sub-periods—primarily export-led growth
during the ﬁrst globalization until the 1920s and ISI from the Great Depression to the 1960s—is
not to neglect the process of early industrialization in our three countries. For a review about this
process in the region, see Marcelo Rougier (ed.), Estudios sobre la industria en América Latina:
Interpretaciones y debates (Buenos Aires, 2016). However, the driver of the economic evolution
Fig.1 MLD Components in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, 1890–
1960
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of analysis is particularly unfortunate in the case of regional
inequality, because the evolution of income per capita in a re-
gion can be strongly inﬂuenced by economic activity in the
neighboring regions (through trade, migration, technological
spillovers, etc.). An inspection of Figures 3 and 4, with the sub-
national units characterized by their average income, reveals
that the regions with the highest average income at the beginning
of our study in 1890 are in the geographical extremeties of Chile
and its capital of Santiago, in the southern regions of Argentina, and
in the three regions of Uruguay. The reasons for these high incomes
are the nitrate cycle in northern Chile; the capital effect related to
urban economies in Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Montevideo; and
the low-density agrarian regions of southern Argentina and Chile.
The regions below the average were concentrated around the
center and the north of Argentina.
Thirty years later, the copper cycle replaced the nitrate cycle
in Chile, but the overall picture remained unchanged: Both the
top and bottom of the country and the capital were still the richest
areas, as were the southern regions of Argentina and Uruguay.
Other rich areas were around Buenos Aires, because of a diffusion
during the ﬁrst globalization was the exploitation of natural resources (land and nitrates) and the
exports of food and raw materials with low degrees of elaboration. Such is the focus of our
analysis.
Fig.2 Regional Inequality by Country, 1890–1960
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effect. The poorest regions experienced some changes. Some of
them converged to the regional average, but others remained poor,
speciﬁcally those in the northern Argentina. The Great Depression
and the ISI process changed the 1960s map in the Argentinean case,
while the pattern in Chile and Uruguay remained largely similar.
The copper cycle provided a boost to the northern and the central
regions in Chile, and in Argentina, a division between coastal and
northern interior regions was reinforced (see Figure 5).
To check statistically the appearance of this cluster of rich
regions in the south and of poor regions in the north, we run a
simple test to obtain local Moran’s I coefﬁcient for all the regions.
With this test, we can check the existence of a statistical relation-
ship between the regional GDP per capita of any region and the
level of GDP per capita in its neighboring regions (Figure 6).
Speciﬁcally, we are interested in the spatial dimension of this
Fig.3 Regional GDP Per Capita in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay,
1890
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coefﬁcient, to identify the existence of clusters of rich or poor
regions inside the three countries or along the borders.18
The spatial autocorrelation conﬁrms the existence of two
clusters of regions in the Southern Cone. The cluster of richer re-
gions in the south, at both sides of the border, appeared toward
1960, although we could notice the existence of rich regions in
the south of Chile and Argentina at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The other cluster, statistically signiﬁcant, is a cluster of poorer
regions in the inner north of Argentina, which is increasingly
expanding toward neighboring regions.
Notably, the fact that the dynamic of Chile—apart from this
cluster in the south—does not seem to be inﬂuenced by the
18 We considered a distance matrix in which the cells of two contiguous regions take the num-
ber one and zero otherwise. For more detail about spatial-autocorrelation analysis, see Luc Anselin,
“Local Indicators of Spatial Association-LISA,” Geographical Analysis, XXVII (2010), 93–115.
Fig.4 Regional GDP Per Capita in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay,
1920
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proximity of Argentina, or vice versa, tends to support the hypoth-
esis about the effect of the mountains—Cordillera de los Andes—on
the social and economic evolution of both countries. Our evi-
dence conﬁrms the idea that the Andes served as “a barrier, almost
a defense, and a protective wall.”19
The dynamics of Uruguay have some similarities with those
in Entre Ríos and the province of Buenos Aires (at least in the re-
gions on the eastern frontier), and a diffusion effect might emanate
from the agglomeration economies of both capitals, Montevideo
and Buenos Aires (we did not observe a statistically signiﬁcant cor-
relation). Historically, these cities formed a common economic
Fig.5 Regional GDP Per Capita in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay,
1960
19 Claudio Maíz, “La cordillera de los Andes: de muro a portal: Visiones del otro a través
del espacio,” Revista de Literaturas Modernas, XXVII (2007), 113–156.
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space, with an important trade via the River Plate and the connec-
tion of the Uruguay and Parana Rivers with Brazil, Paraguay, and
Bolivia. The consolidation of the national states in the last third of
the nineteenth century threatened the development of the inter-
regional trade and promoted a competition between the two cities
to become the “exit door” of the River Plate.20
In Chile, the causes of the spatial distribution of economic
activity were the nitrate cycle and the economic expansion of
the northern provinces and its linkages to other regions of the
country. The oil cycle in the south had a similar effect, although it
20 The “exit door” refers to the capacity of the ports of Buenos Aires and Montevideo to
connect the production of the economic space encompassed by Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay,
Bolivia, and the south of Brazil to the international markets of commodities. Lilia Zanotti, “Un
ciclo comercial en la Cuenca del Plata (1852–1920),” Revista Complutense de Historia de América,
XVIII (1992), 219–239.
Fig.6 Local Moran’s Spatial-Autocorrelation Indexes for Argentina,
Chile, and Uruguay, 1890–1960
NOTES Year benchmarks are 1890, 1920, 1940, and 1960. Light gray indicates high spatial
correlation between poor regions. Darker shades of gray indicate higher spatial correlation
between poor regions and lighter shades of gray, lower spatial correlation between rich
regions.
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was smaller due to its short duration. The copper cycle performed
differently due to the dispersion of copper deposits.21
An understanding of convergence analysis complements the
insights generated by the evolution of regional inequality as pre-
sented in the previous paragraphs. This article explores the process
of unweighted convergence. Following Rodrik, the empirical
model is based on a simple speciﬁcation in which the growth rate
of per capita GDP is a function of the distance between the steady-
state level and the initial level of per capita GDP and other charac-
teristics speciﬁc to each country. The econometric speciﬁcation
has the form
y^it ¼ αþ β lnyit þ γDi þ εit; (4)
where ŷit is the growth rate of GDP per capita in region i in each
time frame (identiﬁed by t); yit is the level of GDP per capita at
the beginning of the time frame in that region; and Di is some
characteristic of region i (typically in our exercise, belonging to a
particular country).22
The number of subnational units is reduced to three in
Uruguay and eight in Chile. Given that, according to Maddison,
Argentina’s per capita GDP was clearly higher than that of
Chile and Uruguay in 1920, we can evaluate the hypothesis that
Argentina’s steady state was different in this period. Hence, the
national dummy will identify whether the region belongs
to Argentina. The main results for the period from 1890 to
1920—corresponding to the ﬁrst globalization—show strong
evidence of convergence; the Argentina dummy (dum_arg) is
not signiﬁcant (Table 1, column 1).23
Figure 7 presents a scatter plot indicating the growth rates for
all of the regions in the three countries between 1890 and 1920 on
21 Carmen Cariola Sutter and Osvaldo Sunkel, Un Siglo de historia económica de Chile 1830–1930:
dos ensayos y una bibliografía (Madrid, 1983); Badia-Miró, “La localización de la actividad económica
en Chile, 1890–1973”; idem, “The Evolution of the Location of Economic Activity in Chile in the
Long Run”; idem and César Yáñez, “Localization of Industry in Chile, 1895–1967: Mining Cycles
and State Policy,” Australian Economic History Review, LV (2015), 256–276.
22 Branco Milanovic, “Global Inequality Recalculated: The Effect of New 2005 PPP,” Policy
Research working paper, WPS 5061© World Bank (2009), available at https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/4252 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO; Dani Rodrik, “Unconditional
Convergence in Manufacturing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXXVIII (2013), 165–204.
23 Formally, the dummy variable in this case will be D=1 if the region is in Argentina and
D=0 otherwise.
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the vertical axis and the GDPs in 1890 on the horizontal axis. It is con-
sistent with the results presented in Column 1 of Table 1, and it is clear
evidence of convergence, showing the regions of the three coun-
tries mixed in all the portions of the graph, without signiﬁcant
outliers.
However, in the period of the Import Substitution Industrial-
ization (ISI) (1940 to 1960), we ﬁnd no evidence of convergence. If
we include the three countries in the sample (Column 2 of Table 1),
the non-convergence hypothesis cannot be rejected even if we in-
corporate the possibility of a different steady state for Argentina.
The scatter plots in Figure 8—with growth rates between 1940
and 1960 in the vertical axis and GDP per capita in 1940 in the hor-
izontal axis—suggest that the reason for this result is twofold: (1)
Argentina (at the top) shows a clear process of divergence (the
higher the initial level of per capita GDP in 1940, the higher the
growth rates). (2) If we consider Chile and Uruguay together (at
the bottom), the region of Magallanes is an outlier exerting a strong
inﬂuence on the results of the regression.
Table 1 Convergence Regression of Regional Growth in Argentina, Chile,
and Uruguay (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
REGION
ALL THREE
COUNTRIES
ALL THREE
COUNTRIES
a
ARGENTINA
CHILE AND URUGUAY
(WITHOUT MAGALLANES)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
GROWTH
1890–1920 GROWTH 1940–1960
lngdppc1890 −0.012
(5.25)**
dum_arg 0.000
(0.09)
−0.007
(0.79)
lngdppc1940 0.011
(1.35)
0.028
(3.34)**
−0.021
(8.98)**
Constant 0.096
(5.57)**
−0.069
(1.02)
−0.199
(3.22)**
0.182
(9.81)**
R2 0.57 0.15 0.34 0.90
N 35 36 24 11
*p<0.10.
**p<0.05.
aThis speciﬁcation has thirty-six observations because we include a ﬁgure for Aysén (in Chile),
which is not available for 1890.
NOTES lngdppc is initial GDP per capita; dum_arg is Argentina dummy.
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A formal test of the process of divergence in Argentina from
1940 to 1960 is presented in Column 3 of Table 1 where the
parameter of initial level of GDP in the regression is signiﬁcantly
positive. Similarly, without the outlier of Magallanes (Table 1,
Column 4), the evidence for convergence in Chile and Uruguay
is strong and highly signiﬁcant, even though we have only eleven
observations in the sample.
The pattern in the evolution of inequality for the three
countries is consistent with the results of the convergence analysis:
Argentina and Chile have a U-shaped curve, and Uruguay shows
declining inequality in the two sub-periods. We can also conﬁrm
the speciﬁc pattern for Argentina, when comparing it with the
other countries. We can observe convergence from 1890 to 1920
for the three countries, convergence for Chile and Uruguay (after
the removal of Magallanes) in the twentieth century, but not for
Argentina. The ISI and inward-looking policies had an egalitarian
effect in Chile and Uruguay but not for Argentina.
This patternﬁnds some support in theMLD indices:Whereas Chile
and Argentina follow a U-shape consistent with the pattern of ﬁrst
Fig.7 Growth Rates between 1890 and 1920 in all of the Regions in
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay
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convergence and then divergence, Uruguay shows a monotonically
decreasing inequality (consistent with an unchanging convergence).
The increase in inequality at theendofourperiodof analysis hasdifferent
drivers. In Chile, it was the result of an exploitation of natural resources
(especially oil inMagallanes) in a few regions, whereas in Argentina,
it was the result of expansion in Buenos Aires and certain provinces
in Patagonia reaping the beneﬁts of abundant natural resources.
The leading sectors behind the regional economies with
higher growth rates differed between countries. For the
Fig.8 Growth Rates between 1940 and 1960 and GDP in 1940 in
Argentina (Upper Panel) and Chile and Uruguay (Lower Panel)
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Argentinean case, our analysis of the regional divergence in
the period from 1920 to 1960 shows that the initially rich
and fast-growing provinces (in the context of persistent diver-
gence) were Capital Federal, where agglomeration economies
affected the secondary and tertiary sectors, and Tierra del
Fuego and Santa Cruz, regions with low-density populations
and abundant land. Tierra del Fuego’s expansion of the public
sector accounts for an important share of its total regional
increase. State expansion strongly affected the sparsely popu-
lated districts in that certain public investments, even small
ones, produced relevant effects in productivity and income
per capita.
In the Chilean case, an intense concentration of economic
activity occurred around Santiago, the capital, and different
mining cycles (nitrate, copper, and oil) affected regional in-
equality. Natural resources and the dynamics of the capital
(the political dimension, high market potential, but small ag-
glomeration economies) determined the location of economic
activity in the long run. The mining cycles had different effects
on the spatial distribution of economic activity. For nitrates and
oil, an increase in disparities in regional GDP per capita polarized
the country because the huge expansion of demand in a few
regions generated strong linkages to other regions (the oil cycle
concentrated in the South, although short, had some similarities
with the nitrate cycle in that respect). However, the copper
cycle, which was more scattered and capital-intensive, had a
smaller impact on spatial concentration.
Economic growth in the three selected South American coun-
tries in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was not based
exclusively on industrial expansion; it was also the result of an
exploitation of natural resources in the context of a strong inte-
gration into the international markets of goods and production
factors. Eventually, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay showed a
complementary process of industrial growth and heavy state
intervention after 1930.
Because some of the regions in Argentina and Chile with
abundant natural resources (frontier economies) had low popula-
tion density, regional inequality was unusually pronounced in
those countries at the end of the nineteenth century. The level
138 | BADIA-MIRO, NICOLINI, AND WILLEBALD
of regional inequality in Uruguay, a country with considerable
land but no frontier economy, was more in line with those of
European countries.
The peculiar pattern of growth in these countries has strong
implications for the evolution of inequality. From 1890 to 1920,
when the process of export-led growth was still dominant in the
three countries, inequality was decreasing. Certain regions,
strongly favored at ﬁrst by the international demand for a limited
set of commodities in agriculture (Argentina and Uruguay) and
mining (Chile), eventually started to experience decreasing
marginal returns. In the second period, after the Great Depres-
sion and the international recession of the 1930s, the evolution
of inequality depended on how each country adapted to a
protectionist world, implemented ISI policies, and dealt with the
regional dimension of natural-resource exploitation (especially
related to the mining cycles). The convergence analysis conﬁrms
that although convergence is clear and strong in the three coun-
tries between 1890 and 1920, regions in Argentina began to
diverge while those in Chile and Uruguay tended to converge
(excluding the low-density ones).
In Argentina and, to some extent, Chile, state-led industri-
alization policies failed to consolidate the reduction of inequality
that occurred in previous periods; regional disparities persisted in
these countries. In Uruguay, however, economic development
included a concerted effort to reduce inequality, and conver-
gence had a noticeable effect until the last decades of the twen-
tieth century.
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